Information and Communication Security

0200-0230

Thimphu, Bhutan Province

me: da whr r u?
B: home
 u?
me: me too
B: i got ligament tear da
me: how??????????
B: my right thumb....while playin basketball
me: damn now how do u write nething?
B: i cant
me: damn now how abt s8? wht u gonna do? whn will it be alryt?
B: two more weeks
 will have viva series
me: thn no probs?
ok
B: got good marks in fir

The sudden loss of connection with his friend did not worry Jibin. After all internet is not as good everywhere in the world. However when repeated attempts at buzzing his friend who is on an exchange program with a foreign university did not work Jibin raised the chat window. He tried to raise chats with some other friends who are online and it all worked out, except for those of his friends who are abroad. Jibin did not however pay much heed to it and when he came back after making some coffee around 20 minutes later, a cousin of his working abroad had pinged him for a chat. Without worrying much about the seeming loss of communications some time back, Jibin went back to his chats.

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Urumqi, Xinjiang Province

The phone is ringing. The man wakes up and groggily switches on the bedlamp and fumbles to pick up the telephone receiver.
“Hello, who is this?”
“Sir, this is Mandhar Kanth calling from Jaffna Branch Office. We have a serious situation here. There has been an accident on the assembly plant and four employees are injured.”
The bad news from a major branch office of the Tatra Automative Works jolted Yevgeny Filat, the Vice President (Productions) of TAW. Sitting up on the bed he checked the time on the bedside alarm and asked,
“Yes Kanth, I am listening. What happened down there?”
“Sir, the crane for the engine block assembly yard had one of its chains break and the engine block came crashing down on the assembly floor. The four injured are the assembly line movers. Condition of one is critical and the other three also have some serious injuries. We have sent them to the hospital, however the assembly line is now halted. We have 10 more units of the order from Ceylon Tea Corporation pending which we have to deliver by tomorrow.”
“Is there no way you can speed up the schedule?”
“No Sir, we are as of now fixing the crane, however that in itself is two hours of work lost. We have also sent for replacement staffers from other shifts but they also would not be here for another three hours. It is not possible to complete the order tomorrow itself.”
“Okay, I will place a call to the Ceylon Tea Corporation myself informing about the delay, meanwhile…….”
The sudden beeping sound of termination of connection annoyed the Yevgeny however he brought up the number from caller list and dialed it again. Again no connection. By now he was getting more and more annoyed and tiptoing softly to avoid waking up his sleeping wife, Yevgeny went to his study to turn on his laptop to call Mandhar Kanth via the company intercom portal. Again an inexplicable fault is preventing Yevgeny to initiate communications with the Jaffna Branch. He then called the Tatra Corporate Communications Center in downtown Urumqi and ordered them to set up a secure satellite communications line. After an excruciating 15 minute delay, the connection was made with Jaffna branch and Filat could complete relaying the instructions to his subordinate official.

------------------------------------------------------------------------


Shaukat Afzal is driving his truck carrying a consignment of vegetables from Pollachi to Palghat when the Coimbatore FM radio station he loved to listen to suddenly went off the air. Though he tried to switch to all other FM and MW channels in his truck’s radio console, all of them gave the same static. Cursing his old truck’s radio system, Shaukat switched on the rackety old tape player to listen to some Tamil film music.

------------------------------------------------------------------------


Heng Bao is sleeping by the counter in the 24 hours Fuel Station on the road between New Delhi and Jaipur while the television in the corner of his booth is flickering at mute. At 2AM the scheduled news program was disrupted and only static was seen on the TV. If Bao had tried switching to other channels the same static would have been seen. Even when the channels came back at 2.30 Heng Bao did not notice anything, engrossed as he was in a very deep sleep.

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Similar communication outages occurred all over Cochin. It would also be experienced by any person from a foreign country on trying to initiate communications with people in Cochin. Just as inexplicably as the communication breakages occurred, precisely 30 minutes later, it was reestablished.

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Bangalore, Karnataka Province

The routine Communication Security Protocol Testing was successfully completed by the Section 323 personnel along with the National Communications Database, National Reconnaissance Agency and Strategic Reconnaissance Agency. At a single command from Gen. Mohammad Faraz of Royal Cochin Police Force at 0145, all communication channels to outside of Cochin had been blocked. In the concerted action, overrides placed with all the cellphone networks, Internet Service Providers, Landline telephone service providers, radio stations and television stations. All commercial communication satellites would also be subjected to inexplicable jamming while over Cochin airspace for these thirty minutes, seeming like a software glitch. During this thirty minute period of communications blackout, the National Reconnaissance Agency’s electronic intelligence satellites and network of terrestrial antennae would sweep for any sort of electromagnetic signal traversing the Cochin skies. Complete communication blackout would be thus enforced and ensured. After the routine test, the communication systems were reset with most citizens of Cochin hardly noticing what happened. 

Local Area Attrition Defense Policy

"Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen. My name is Lt. Gen. Shankar Iyer, Chief of Army Staff, Royal Cochin Defense Forces. Today you, Municipal Commissioners of Ministry of Interior, officers of Royal Cochin Police Forces, National Defense Corps planning officers, Border Guard Brigade Commanders and staff of General Staff High Command are here to enumerate the Attrition Land Defense Doctrine for our nation."

"This week you would be creating the planning structure for our multi-layered defense structure. Currently our Border Guards are the principal defense layer. Each Border Guards Brigade has a defensive depth of 50 km during which they have emplaced adequate defenses to stop a massed assault as well as area assault. However the General Staff High Command cannot depend on a single layer of defense. We need better doctrine and systems to ensure the defense of our nation."

"War is an uncertain business. All our plans may get invalidated at the point of commencement of conflict. However that does not mean, we should not plan for those contingencies we can foresee and prepare for. Our current defense posture is designed to repulse multiple front assault by using the Border Guards to delay the invasion and then use the Royal Cochin Army formations to perform counter offense against the enemy formations. Now this doctrine is perfectly suited if and when we are invaded by an army of comparable size to Royal Cochin Army. It also lends greater thrust on high mobility warfare conducted within our borders by our premier strike forces. This doctrine was enough when Royal Cochin Army had one of the largest armies in the region and our strategic security was more secure."

"However what would happen if we were invaded by forces that grossly outnumber us? The Royal Cochin Army no longer has the absolute superiority in numbers that we enjoyed until the secession of Kazakhstan and Kyrghyztan. The Global strategic politics has also evolved in such a manner as it is possible that we may be faced with grossly outnumbering forces. In such a case depending on high mobility warfare alone would not be enough, we must prepare our nation to fight a high intensity attrition warfare as well."

"It is not possible to have defense structures like Border Guard Brigades spread out throughout the Kingdom. Such a policy would be a gross waste of our resources and man power. They would also be tactically unsound. It would spread our conventional and regular forces far too thinly, a situation that brings Napoleon's admonition on smuggling to memory. It is also pointless to create fortifications reminiscent of Maginot Line or Atlantic Line. No, what we need are more simpler, but more effective fortifications, that are easier to construct, and inexpensive in terms of men or material. This should be a defense network that can be maintained easily during peace time, with no unnecessary constraints on national economy or cause any grievance to our population."

"This is the policy as has been devised by Royal Cochin Army, Ministry of Interior and Royal Cochin Police Forces. The National Defense Corps formations in every Province and in every Municipality would be tasked to identify various potential axis of attack that could come upon their locality. City, Town and Village based defenses are what we are planning for. We should make every village as a point of attrition. Every center of population must be capable of supporting defensive operations. We must conceptualize a hostile force which would be massively over numbering us, we must slow their advance, we must be able to wage an attrition warfare so intense that they quit their invasion. For this every center of population must become a fortress in effect, complete with basic defensive structures, passive defenses and active defenses, called a Local Administrative Area Defense (LAAD)."

"NDC personnel along with Municipality Officials shall construct numerous Reserve Arsenals which shall be concealed structures with sizable weapons stores. Sizable quantities of fire arms for squad defenses, heavy machine guns, infantry mortars, Anti Tank Guided Missiles, MANPADS, Anti Vehicle and Anti Personnel Mines, field radios, demolition explosives and large quantities of infantry grade ammunition. All these weapons are to be drawn from respective QMC depots in the area. The major QMC depots could be identified by enemy and even destroyed, but the tools for defense must be scattered for ready use. Warehouses should also be maintained with structural materials for road blocks, hedge hogs, Caltropes, Barbed Wire, Sand bags and armor for pill box defenses. These stores would be maintained by the local NDC personnel along with the Municipality and Police officers of the area. These sites must also be made aware to the local Border Guard Brigades and any regular army formations. All help would be provided to conceal these depots using maskirovska. The NDC units must also prepare defense strategy so that in the event of a national emergency the required buildings in the area can easily be fortified s centers of resistance."

"Apart from these stores of local administrative area defense units (LAAD), NDC are also expected to establish District level Artillery Reserve Battalions (DARB). In every District concealed depots for the fielding of one full Battalion of 155mm Towed Guns must be established. These depots would comprise of the guns, tow trucks and sufficient ammunition and fuel for 45 days of continuous fighting. These DARB would also have integrated Air Defense Units to protect the artillery battalion comprising of a Company of Anti Air Artillery, tracked and wheeled."

"This would be the preliminary defense structure for the Attrition Defense Policy. The reserve personnel comprising the National Defense Corps wont be manning and operating these defenses, their operation would continue to be the mandate of service personnel of Royal Cochin Army. The National Defense Corps's principal duty would be as a support infrastructure for the combat operations which would be conducted by Royal Cochin Army units which would be assigned to these sectors. Only in case of incapacitation of these regular units can the local NDC units take over. The combat efficiency and tactical expertise of Royal Cochin Army units is not expected to be attained by the reserve duty personnel of National Defense Corps. However the local area expertise, tactical intelligence and terrain knowledge of the NDC personnel in these LAAD would be extremely important for sustained operations by the RCA units which is not expected to have local area awareness for effective defense. So both these formations would be mutually supportive but would have their own area of expertise."

"Now detailed information regarding tactics and procedures for this policy would be taught to you in this week. Accordingly you must supervise the establishment of these defenses in your assigned LAADs. Your dedication and work is absolutely essential for the all encompassing defense of our nation. Reserve personnel of NDC who report for their active duty would henceforth be trained in this policy so that during their weeks of service they learn how to properly integrate with regular units to mount an effective defense of their LAAD."

"So best of luck, Gentlemen. Let us work hard to secure our nation." 

Anti Air Defense Doctrine

Anti Air Defense Doctrine

The Anti Air Defense Doctrine comprises of an Outer Area Defense and Inner Area Defense. Outer Area Defense involves the defensive network of warly warning radars and a interdiction Air Defense Batteries arrayed around the border regions of the Kingdom. The Outer Area Defense has already expostulated as per Integrated Defense Policy of dividing the nation into three sectors, with each sector having interlinked radar networks with strategic depth. The Outer Area Defense's radar networks consists of 200 NM range, XL12 radars and 400 NM range XL117 radars. The interconnecting networks of these radars provide a nearly impregnable Air Defense Barrier along the borders of the nation. 

XL12 and XL117 as stationary radar installations and hence are liable to be targeted in an Anti Radiation attack as a precursor to deep penetration strikes on the Kingdom's territory. Thus these are reinforced along the borders by a secondary layer of radars operated by each Border Guard Brigade consisting of a Battalion of Mobile Radar trucks per Brigade and Aerostats which provide a low level air defense potential.

The detection capabilities of the OAD radar network is complemented by batteries of Surface to Air Missiles comprising of SD5, SD4, SD3, SD2 and SD2R air defense missiles. OAD has 5 batteries of each of these missiles discretely and stealthily installed per Border Guard Brigade sector. These installations are naturally camouflaged fixed installations which would receive targeting and terminal guidance from the Air Defense Network and would not have independent guidance systems to prevent them being targeted due to their radiation parameters. These fixed RCAF defense batteries would be reinforced by the mobile SAM batteries maintained by the Border Guard Brigades for tactical low level air defense.

The Outer Area Defense is reinforced by the Inner Area Defense which defines Air Defense in the interior zones of the Kingdom. IAD involves 60 km range XL27 radars which would be installed every 2500 square kilometers in the Kingdom. This network again involves a design such that any specific land area would be covered by at least 2 XL27 radars to facilitate triangulation and redundancy. The XL27 radars are automated facilities that would be remotely controlled by Zonal Air Defense Commands in each Province of the Kingdom. The operation of these radars would also be governed by Air Defense Network. These uniform radar concentration is reinforced by concentrated radar coverage in certain Air Attack Corridors determined by RCAF which are atmospherically and strategically optimum for an air attack on a territory. This includes mountain passes, mountain ranges, strategic hills near cities etc. IAD also involves Aerostat mounted radars for special protection of high density population regions, such as cities, towns etc.

The offensive form of IAD consists of Surface to Air Missile batteries located around every major city and town, power stations, power grid components, major industrial, scientific and commercial facilities, vital logistic and transport corridors and vital defense establishments. High population centers and above mentioned target types would also have automated CIWS batteries arrayed around them in ringed defensive perimeters. IAD includes defense of Astra rail gun batteries.

The third layer of Air Defense is the Strategic Defense Network consisting of HAWK Over the Horizon radars installed at 5 locations in the Kingdom of Cochin, the 5 Bright Star locations and the Anti Ballistic Missile Batteries located around major population, industrial and defense centers.

The concentration of these large number of radars and Air Defense systems would be imperfect without the Air Defense Network. This is a high bandwidth information pathway that connects every single radar and every single offensive weapon platform in the Kingdom. This highly automated protocol has been developed by Strategic Command, Royal Cochin Air Force and Varma Institute of Fundamental Research. This communication network depends on a physical layer consisting of optical fiber cables in reinforced pathways, secure satellite burst communications and Integrated Military Communications Network. Air Defense Network is a form of cloud computing whereby every single radar is a node and an integrated air defense status is created by the network. It is not necessary for all the radars to be online at any time. The information gained by any single radar is simultaneously passed on to the ADN grid by which every radar gets the picture. The protocol is an intelligent system which randomly activates and deactivates radars in the network so that any single radar may not lend itself to be targeted by a hostile force. The random switching nature of ADN also lends it a pulsating nature. The multiple layered defenses means that the redundant defenses would be activated only when the primary defenses in the sector has been destroyed. This destruction would in any way alert the Air Defense Network which can call in reinforcements from RCAF's fighter regiments assigned to the Air Defense Zone.

Threats detected are engaged by the the SAM batteries whose missiles receive targeting information not from a single radar but from the communication network itself. This communication with the missile is maintained either through the launcher itself or through MILCOM network which exists independent of ADN. Thus even if one or more radars in the region is shut down, the missile would continue to be tracked and receive targeting from the other defense communication infrastructure in the Kingdom. The Air Defense Network can also work with airborne and maritime radar platforms with ease. To prevent its incapacitation during EMP attack, all ADN assets have been protected by Class A Silver Shield Protocol and only Silver Shield rated switching gear and hardware have been used.

While XL class of radars use Ionosonders, and Phased Array technology with electronically controlled wave guidance, Hawk Radars use 12MW powered multistatic radar, creeping waves and electromagnetic surface waves for its operations.

Ultimately Anti Air Defense Doctrine is created not to defend against an overwhelming airborne attack on its own, but to provide warning that such an attack is taking place to RCAF Command and provide as much attrition as it can. The Air Defense Network has proven its robustness in several air defense exercies and simulations and survivability against wide spectrum EMP attacks conducted by High Energy Research Institute. 

The doctrine and its components are available for sharing with the valued allies of the Kingdom of Cochin.

Integrated Defense Policy

Integrated Defense Policy
Royal Cochin Defense Forces

As Commanded by His Highness Kerala Varma, the King of Cochin , Royal Cochin Defense Forces has the primary mandate with regards to the defense of the realm.

The Integrated Defense Policy comprised of Territorial, Maritime and Aerial Defense of the nation. The various individual policies are the mandates of various branches of the RCDF, however are required to perform in an integrated manner at all times. While several aspects of the Integrated Defense Policy has already been enumerated by various responsible branches, certain aspects have rooms for improvements, hence the promulgation of the new policy directives.

The defense of the realm has been divided into three zones of action, Maritime Defense, Himalayan Defense and Xinjiang Defense. This is due to the unique geographical nature of these Zones of Action. 

Maritime Defense Zone comprises the coastal provinces of India from coast of Gujarat to Chittagong in Bengal Province, Lakshadweep - Maldives Administration, Andaman - Nicobar Administration and Baloch Province.

Himalayan Defense Zone refers to the plain regions of India, from Gujarat to Assam Province, the Himalayan areas of Tibet and Kashmir.

The Xinjiang Defense Zone refers to the Xinjiang Province and the National Capital Territory.

With regard to Terrestrial defense of the Kingdom, the prime mandate goes to the Border Guards Directorate of RCDF. Border Guards has an already robust constitution and effective defense policies with regards to facing an attack from land. There is unlikely to be any changes to the Border Guard Doctrine or Terrestrial Defense Doctrine.



With regard to Maritime Defense, its application lies exclusively in the Maritime Defense Zone in India. This defense is to be a multi-layered system which is flexible, practical, robust and effective. The onus is on economical passive defenses at the front end defenses,ie, a network of tidal wave generators along the appropriate coastal areas so that the tidal power of the waves can be generated for electricity. Established a few meters off the coast line, these generators would generate adequate electric power for local communities, provide storm shelter, as well as provide calmer channels for local fishing industries to pass through into open seas. The design and layout of these tidal power generators would be such that they would create an effective passive defense against hostile amphibious operations. Local Area Attrition Defense groups organized by National Defense Corps would also ready stockpiles of hedgehogs to be deployed in times of crisis. 

Further offshore, at distances of 12 NM, 23 NM, 47 NM, 55 NM from coast lines there would be layers of mines and ISLMM Torpedoes, with mine free channels designated by Royal Cochin Coast Guard. RCCG has the mandate of maintaining these mine fields with waters beyond 60 NM the responsibility of Royal Cochin Navy. Commercial ships transiting Cochin waters would get channels of sailing assigned to them by the Royal Cochin Navy and Royal Cochin Coast Guard through Ministry of Transportation, Department of Shipping.

The network of mines and the passive defense structure provided by tidal power generators is expected to be a delaying factor and not a stopping factor with regards to a determined amphibious assault. Active counter measures in any case would be provided by the network of Astra rail gun systems located every 50 NM along the coast of the Kingdom. The 200 NM range offensive weapons is expected to give an adequate attrition to any enemy force and batteries of POSID AShMs established every 50 km by RCCG stations is expected to give fixed long range defense solutions. A network of Aerostats arrayed around the coast is also expected to provide early warning and targeting capabilities to the weapons platforms. The Astra Systems would be protected by individual AAD batteries and Strategic Command Combat soldiers. They would be further supported by the proposed Static Area Defense Platforms, which are static batteries of 155 mm field guns, installed and operated as camouflaged structures and operated by the National Defense Corps personnel.

All this would be augmented by the Air Defense Network's layers of radars. A total of 47, 200 NM XL12 radars and 6, 400 NM XL117 radars are currently operational in this Zone as part of the Air Defense Doctrine which would contribute to improve the Maritime Defenses.

If and when the Maritime Defenses are breached the mandate for defense rests upon Royal Cochin Army.

In Himalayan Defense Zone, the terrestrial defense is the mandate of the Border Guards and the air defense that of Royal Cochin Air Force. A total of 19, 200 NM XL12 radars and 5, 400 NM XL117 radars are currently operational in this Zone as part of the Air Defense Doctrine.

In Xinjiang Defense, due to the location of Cochin City and number of potentially hostile neighbors, the defense is deemed the highest priority. A total of 27, 200 NM XL12 radars and 5, 400 NM XL117 radars are currently operational as part of the Air Defense Doctrine in this one single province alone.

The Air Defense Doctrine envisions interspersed layers of XL12 and XL117 radars with the HAWK Strategic Radars to provide Air Defense Warning. Dedicated Anti Air Defense Batteries would be stationed along side Border Guard defenses and around all vital industrial and population centers. All vital buildings would have dedicated mobile AAA companies assigned. To support the AAA batteries would be installed primary, secondary and tertiary CIWS systems. Aerial Warning Aerostats would be deployed in all border regions, at the rate of one per 50 kilometers and one per 100 kilometers staggered 60 kilometers to the rear. In terms of conflict Air Defense Doctrine would also make use the the AWACS regiments of HALOBs and MERATs of Royal Cochin Air Force. Threats detected by the Air Defense Doctrine would be interdicted by the Royal Cochin Air Force.

The Integrated Defense Policy is aimed at making any offense against the Kingdom of Cochin a painstaking and costly affair for an aggressor and to negate opportunities for tactical surprise to the aggressors. Using a variety of active and passive defense doctrines, the Kingdom is hoping to establish a multi-spectrum defense solution so that any single form of attack will not cripple our defense. The Integrated Defense Policy is designed by conceptualizing a worst case scenario wherein, the Kingdom of Cochin faces attacks from multiple fronts, ie, a minimum of 8 fronts and an undisclosed maximum. Integrated Defense Policy is not an infallible doctrine and would be subject to revisions as per changing strategic climates, defense necessities and improving military technologies.

MARITIME DEFENSE ZONE

Resized to 74% (was 1360 x 747) - Click image to enlarge

HIMALAYAN DEFENSE ZONE

Resized to 74% (was 1360 x 747) - Click image to enlarge

XINJIANG DEFENSE ZONE

Resized to 74% (was 1360 x 747) - Click image to enlarge

Airborne Deployment Exercise

HAMI, XINJIANG

The Third Airborne is deploying for its Divisional Combat exercises. The Regimental Headquarters of the Marakkar's Airborne at Hami is seeing a flurry of activity with the troops and equipment being driven towards Auxiliary Air Base Hami.

Mission Objective : Secure and occupy NTC Achalpur against Division size infantry force through airborne assault.

SCOUT

The first phase of the mission started with an RCAF Merat being boarded by a platoon of 16 RCSF trained Special Forces scouts. The Merat marked as a transport aircraft lifts off for the long flight towards Maharashtra. The Air Defense aspect of the exercise is not however being tested now.

At 75000 ft altitude above NTC Achalpur, the red warning lights suddenly turned green and the jump master helped each of the 16 commandos to jump out into the inky black night. Assisted by their radium lit altimeter and wrist held GPS the 16 paratroopers maintained their controlled free fall making adjustments to their horizontal vectors by changing their body postures. The webbed jump suits also helped gain a greater degree in control over their flight. Wearing NVG/Thermal/Optical goggles they maintained formation watching and correcting flight as a team. With their Submachine guns safed and strapped tight across their chest, the paratroopers opened their parachutes at 3000 ft above the estimated ground level. Now was their most vulnerable part of operation. They hoped they would not be seen by any hostiles on the ground.

Trusting to their luck that there be safe ground, the 16 commandos landed. The scout leader landed first and his thermal signature on ground enabled the rest of the platoon to make terminal corrections to their descent. One soldier landed on a large rock and fractured his legs. Holding back a scream, the agonized soldier squawked over the encrypted radio asking for assistance. The Captain commanding the platoon and the platoon medic rushed to him and gave him temporary palliative while mending the legs as best as possible using splits. The rest of the platoon spread around the small jungle clearing where they had landed. 

Divisional Intelligence and Reconnaissance had plotted this clearing as most apt for the assault. The scout force had to gather tactical intelligence for the next wave of soldiers who would be waiting for the go order at Hami.

Leaving their stricken colleague to be the radio man, the platoon spread out. They had to scour the territory and make sure that any hostile activity is detected and plan for neutralizing them readied.

Two hours later, they detected a jungle patrol post manned by a team of 5 hostiles with possible radio connectivity. Leaving the scout teams to monitor patterns and gain any tactical intelligence, the team reported back to the Division.

FIRST WAVE

The 4th Assault Brigade of the Third Airborne Division is boarding the HALOBs at the AAB Hami. The 3000 strong Brigade force is currently deployed on a massive airborne assault. With dual mission of parajumping and air cavalry, the assault brigades of the Royal Cochin Ary's Airborne Divisions are trained in both. Each of the 10000 combat soldiers in an Airborne Division has to be para qualified. 

Airborne deployment of an entire brigade along with its equipment is no slight matter. Fully 2 regiments (100 Nos) of HALOBs are tasked to this operation. Each HALOB can carry 100 fully equipped parajumpers, thus 30 HALOBs are devoted to the paratroopers alone, with the remaining 70 tasked to airdrop the heavy equipment needed by the Brigade to hold the ground and prepare the way for the next stage in deployment.

Meanwhile back at NTC Achalpur, 4 commandos have staked out the jungle patrol post, 4 have maintained stationed around likely points of assault and the remaining soldiers have readied remote controlled thermal flares and radio beacons along the clearing with special IR markers denoting hard ground, bad for landing. Soon their combat radio chirped to life and the GO signal was received. 

There was no point in subtlety at this point, the roar of scores of HALOBs is unmistakable for any peaceful purposes. As soon as the GO signal was received the jungle patrol post was attacked and its personnel neutralized. As each Halob passed through a certain designated corridor at 30,000 ft altitude, the parajumpers ran out trusting to the Static Lines to deploy the parachutes. Each Halob would take a semi circular track for the airborne delivery starting from 30,000 ft and ending at 35,000 ft thus ensuring the the flights following them would not be disturbed. The course lasting for a total of 120 seconds would see all 100 parajumpers exiting the aircraft, followed two minutes later by the next HALOB on the same course. Thus in two hours a force of 3000 heavily armed Airborne troops landed in the jungle clearing, immediately setting out to improve their perimeter to make way for the successive brigades. However at this time this brigade is still infantry in nature and its full potency can only be delivered by the heavy equipment now being air dropped by the remaining HALOBs on the course. 

With a Company sized force remaining to oversee the airdrop and prepare a logistics base, the brigade would be assisted by the scout commmandos to expand the defensive perimeter. Until their heavy equipment arrived in a few hours, they would not be able to do any assault but could defend from an attack in limited manner. 

Meanwhile 35,000 ft up, the rear bay doors are opening up for the first squadron of 15 HALOBs as their palletized cargo are being dropped by the jumpmasters. The leading parachutes pull the pallets, 5 to a HALOB from the cavernous hold of the transport aircraft. Altitude activated lines open the parachutes automatically and special air drop specialists on the ground guide the remote controlled control station of the parachutes by timely adjustments. The pallets dropping on the ground are carefully recovered by the logistics company, who proceed to deploy out the field mortars, field guns, ammunition, food and water in these pallets. The engineer company meanwhile use the clearing equipment from a few of these pallets to expand the jungle clearing.

PHASE THREE

Phase three of the assault involves the landing of heavy equipment and remaining brigades. The jungle strip which is now widened and cleared by the engineer company now sees the first of Metacs and GH44s landing, bringing the BMP3s, BTR90s, BRDMS and the Piranha and Blackhawk helicopters. Another day would see the clearing made still larger and HALOBs bringing more heavy weaponry and MH53s.

GH44 Aerial Artillery Platform would soon join the assault which would be launched by the Airborne Division.

From the first scout landing to full Divisional formation would take a total of 14 days in combat conditions. 

Armored Exercises

National Training Center Jaisalmer

The blistering heat and shimmering mirages are not deterring the steady advance of the T100 Main Battle Tank as it wound its way through the sand dunes and sand traps used as static defenses by the X ACR, which is defending this landscape. The S-RECO that was launched a while ago had revealed some enemy opposition 5 kilometers ahead before it was shot down by some SAM. As the leader of the scout platoon of the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment's 1st Brigade, Echo 256 would have to blast a way through the enemy force. The reconnaissance battle is over for now, both sides have a reasonable disposition about the others' forces. 

The 1 Brigade is at the front of this assault and his Battalion is stretched behind him. This was a do or die moment. He had to render a hole in the enemy forces' against marked superiority. The Brigade's artillery and MRLS had been wiped out by the enemy's helicopter gunships in a dare devil strike which was compensated by the entire helicopter battalion sized force being wiped out by his Air Defense IFVs. The loss of artillery would be compensated by the Regiment rushing 2nd Brigade's artillery Battalion to the 1Br front but that would take some hours. Meanwhile 1BR has to shoot its way through against an artillery barrage becoming more and more accurate every minute. Despite the frantic maneuvering the platoon is doing, one of the T100s and two BMP3s have already been destroyed.

"Sir, I have a target."

The gunner yelled out at his commander.

"Load HEAT."
"Loaded in chamber."
"Fire."
"Target. Cease fire. Next."

The pillar of flame that shot out of the T100 4 kilometers away was topped by the blown turret. But before he could savor the joy of the kill, he heard frantic communications from the remaining tanker to his left, which ceased abruptly.

"Brigade, this is Command. Charge at will, we need to get a breakthrough here," the Brigade's Colonel's voice sounded through the battlefield intercom. As on cue the commander of the tank watched his entire Battalion racing up towards the enemy positions firing while on full speed burst. This charge was the only way to outmaneuver the artillery and armor detachment that is holding the front ahead.

As he felt the tank jostling in all directions due to the high speed charge, the Inter Vehicular Information System, showed several tanks of his platoon sending out hit reports.

An hour later the young Lieutenant finished off the last enemy tank with a Sabot round at close range. As he watched the pillar of fire again, he did not feel remorse or regret of having killed a bunch of fellow tankers. No, these targets did not elicit that sort of regret.

All in all it was a good day, a day that really gave him confidence that the strenuous and tough training he and his fellow tankers had undertaken had been validated against a very highly skilled opponent indeed, in fact the most skilled opponent that he can think of, a thinking intelligent Cochin tanker. That too against X ACR, the resident Armored Cavalry Regiment at the NTC Jaisalmer.

"Okay, soldiers, let us pack up," the Lieutenant ordered as he opened the hatch. Blinking against harsh lights emanating from the bright sky upwards, the soldier walked to the Barracks a bare 300 yards away. He was sure the tankers whom he had "killed" during the day's exercise would already be there. Time to get a little payback for all the hazing they did when his Regiment came to the NTC.

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The National Training Center uses decommissioned T100s and T90s of Royal Cochin Army now in Reserve status as live fire dummies for these battle field exercises. Simulation pods in kazernes at the base are used to provide live control to simulate entire Regiments at a time. All the elements of a regiment including its logistics units, vehicles, aircraft and infantry are all simulated in such live fire exercises. The pods control real equipment in the vast Training Range, readied by NTC staff, which are remotely controlled to mimic the actions and commands simulated in the pods.

Since real equipment are used, real combat attrition can be simulated and live weaponry can be used to give a greater training edge to the soldiers. NTC in short simulates real combat, with real material casualties, without any human casualty. It is the most realistic armored combat training school in the world.

X ACR consists of a dedicated facility stationed at NTC to impart Op For capability to the Royal Cochin Army fighting units. Highly skilled educators and decorated soldiers, these instructors study up on every possible military tactic likely to be used in a battlefield so that the Royal Cochin Army soldier is the most well trained soldier on the planet.

Since the vast inventory of National Defense Reserves Stockpile have to be routinely expended to keep the active duty equipment and reserve equipment up to date, such expenditure of equipment is also a cost effective training method. 

Operation Blistering Sands

Operation Blistering Sands

In one of the largest live fire Air Defense Exercise ever to be conducted in the Kingdom of Cochin, National Training Center Jaisalmer would be conducting the Operation Blistering Sands. Operation Blistering Sands would simulate a massive debilitating first strike on a target rich border region using conventional weapons particularly cruise missiles, Surface to Surface Missiles, railguns and the accompanying Air Superiority Attack by an enemy fighter force of 200 fighters supported by 4 AWACS. The 4 day exercise would see the combat validation of the 5 Tier CIWS system that is the backbone of Cochin's Anti Air Defense Network. For such a massive field exercise, the entire Block I stockpile of KUB cruise missiles would be expended along with the Block I stockpile of GG10 Short Range Ballistic Missiles, 1000 SHARM Anti Radiation Missiles along with the support of 5 Astra rail gun batteries.

The defender force would consist of the existing Anti Air Defense Network in the border region between the Kingdom and former Marscurian Pakistan which had not been dismantled for the purpose. A target rich environment would be stimulated with 4 divisional formations, 2 Forward Air Bases, 3 Auxiliary Air Bases, 3 Strategic Reserve Armories, 2 Power Generation Centers, 7 vital logistical checkpoints and three large population centers. The target rich environment would be completely of the simulated nature. The defender force would also have a battery of 50 GG10 Strategic Offense Program missiles for support, as per the Border Guard inventory doctrine. The 5 Tier CIWS system consists of 

Tier I : Surface to Air Missiles
Tier II: JWAL Point Defense Laser System
Tier III: MetalStorm Rocket System
Tier IV: MetalStorm CIWS Gun System
Tier V: 25mm CIWS Guns, STHAL Artillery Interdiction Device

The offense would be mounted by the X ACR of the NTC Jaisalmer would be operating from the NTC Jaisalmer Annexe Zone in the Sindh Province. The defenders would be the routine staff of AADN network in Rajasthan Province. Tactical surprise would be given to the aggressors.

Phase I

The first attack started with a massive volley fire of 500 KUB cruise missiles against the 24 principal targets. Due to the complete tactical surprise won by the aggressors, the Anti Air Defense Network could not activate its Tier I defenses in time from its existing DEFCON FOUR condition. The Tier II JWAL CIWS were powered up within 30 seconds and started to engage the missiles tracked by the ground and Aerostat borne radars of the AADN, neutralizing 25% of incoming missiles. By this time the Tier III, the MetalStorm Rocket Systems had started the volleyfire of the MS-RIM heatseeking rockets fired in MetalStorm's electrically triggered system. These heatseeking rockets successfully neutralized fully 35% of the missiles and by this time the Tier IV, MetalStorm Guns started firing volleys of rounds at the incoming rockets guided by their own millimeter wave tracking radars. After suffering 15% attrition from them another 5% of missiles were intercepted by the Tier V, 25mm Gatling cannons and the STHAL AIDs stationed around the target regions.

Fully 20% of missiles initially fired made their way through the CIWS network and 15% found successful hits on the targets, ie 75 KUB cruise missiles successfully impacted on targets.

Tier I - 0% (0/500 - 0%)
Tier II - 25% (125/500 - 25%)
Tier III - 35% (175/375 - 46.7%)
Tier IV - 15% (75/200 - 37.5%)
Tier V - 5% (25/125 - 20%)

Phase II
The second attack was through 200 GG10 SRBMs fired towards the radar stations and the principal targets. The ballistic vehicles were immediately detected by the Anti Air Defense Network radars and Strategic Air Defense Network satellites. The Defense network started engaging them with the secondary and tertiary batteries taking over as the primary batteries fired earlier are being combat reloaded. The interdiction percentages are as follows:

Tier I - 25% (50/200 - 25%)
Tier II - 20% (40/150 - 26.7%)
Tier III - 30% (60/110 - 54.5%)
Tier IV - 10% (20/50 - 40%)
Tier V - 10% (20/30 - 66.7%)

Five percent of the GG10s made their way through the CIWS network and of that 80% were successful in hitting their targets. Thus 8 GG10s caused massive damages at the principal targets and major radar stations. The backup radar towers were already switched to and thus there was no window of vulnerability.

Phase III
After the first two attacks, the third attack would now be an air attack mounted by four squadrons (50) of Jadayu Mk.2 armed with 300 SHARM - Anti Radiadtion Missiles against the AADN radar network in the region. Engaging the supersonic stealth fighters flying nap of the earth is the Tier I Surface to Air Missile batteries which gain 15% attrition. The Tier II JWAL PDLS are unable to engage the fast moving aircrafts however the Tier III, Tier IV and Tier V defenses have greater success ratio.

Tier I - 15% (7/50 - 15%)
Tier II - 0%
Tier III - 30% (90/255 - 35.3%)
Tier IV - 20% (60/165 - 36.4%)
Tier V - 25% (75/105 - 71.4%)

Of the 10% of SHARMs that successfully penetrated the CIWS network only 2% could successfully find their target due to active radar masking through dummy radars to change the radar pattern centroid for the SHARM target seekers.

Phase IV
By now with such interdiction of attacks by defendes the aggressors start firing their railgun batteries at the Air Defense Sites. The long range Rail Gun Artillery find themselves invincible to the Tiers I, II, III and IV of the AADN but 15% of the projectiles are intercepted by the STHAL Artillery Interdiction Devices of Stage V CIWS. Of the 85% of rounds 75% successfully found targets destroying further Radar sites and CIWS batteries. The backup towers were switched to instantaneously and through the tracking information from the Artillery Tracking Radars, the location of the 5 railgun batteries had been determined. A counter attack was launched towards these railguns using the GG10 SOP missiles, with 5 GG10s targetted per railgun battery for maximum impact with the varied ammunition packages. Two of the railgun batteries of the aggressor have been determined to be out of commission in this counter attack.

Tier I - 0%
Tier II - 0%
Tier III - 0%
Tier IV - 0%
Tier V - 15%

Phase V
As a precursor to a massive final attack the aggressors launch its largest missile volley, a whopping 2500 KUB cruise missile and 200 GG10 SRBMs are launched at the 24 principal targets and Secondary Air Defense Targets. These find them interdicted in this pattern by the AADN.

Tier I - 30% (810/2700 - 30%)
Tier II - 20% (540/1890 - 28.6%)
Tier III - 10% (270/1350 - 20%)
Tier IV - 15% (405/1080 - 37.5%)
Tier V - 20% (540/675 - 80%)

Of the 5% missiles which make their way through 3% find target successfully.

Phase VI
The last phase in the assault is a combined attack by the air, missile and railgun units. The four regiments of fighter aircrafts armed with 700 SHARM follow 1000 KUB missiles and 100 GG10 SRBMs. They would be followed by the remaining three railguns firing its own volleys at the targets. Against this final onslaught the success percentages were:

Tier I - 35% (665/1900 - 35%)
Tier II - 20% (380/1235 - 30.8%)
Tier III - 15% (285/855 - 33.4%)
Tier IV - 20% (380/570 - 66.7%)
Tier V - 5% (95/190 - 50%)

5% of the attacking munitions successfully impacted on the targets.

Overall interdiction efficiency for various Tiers of the Anti Air Defense Network.

Tier I - 1532/5350 - 28.6%
Tier II - 1085/3775 - 28.7%
Tier III - 880/2945 - 29.9%
Tier IV - 940/2065 - 45.5%
Tier V - 755/1125 - 67.1 +15%(PHIV) = 56.68%

With the Operation Blistering Sands successfully completed several valuable lessons had been learned and experience hard won about how to defend against a massive missile attack as a debilitating first strike against a region.