"Good morning, Ladies and Gentlemen. My name is Lt. Gen. Shankar Iyer, Chief of Army Staff, Royal Cochin Defense Forces. Today you, Municipal Commissioners of Ministry of Interior, officers of Royal Cochin Police Forces, National Defense Corps planning officers, Border Guard Brigade Commanders and staff of General Staff High Command are here to enumerate the Attrition Land Defense Doctrine for our nation."
"This week you would be creating the planning structure for our multi-layered defense structure. Currently our Border Guards are the principal defense layer. Each Border Guards Brigade has a defensive depth of 50 km during which they have emplaced adequate defenses to stop a massed assault as well as area assault. However the General Staff High Command cannot depend on a single layer of defense. We need better doctrine and systems to ensure the defense of our nation."
"War is an uncertain business. All our plans may get invalidated at the point of commencement of conflict. However that does not mean, we should not plan for those contingencies we can foresee and prepare for. Our current defense posture is designed to repulse multiple front assault by using the Border Guards to delay the invasion and then use the Royal Cochin Army formations to perform counter offense against the enemy formations. Now this doctrine is perfectly suited if and when we are invaded by an army of comparable size to Royal Cochin Army. It also lends greater thrust on high mobility warfare conducted within our borders by our premier strike forces. This doctrine was enough when Royal Cochin Army had one of the largest armies in the region and our strategic security was more secure."
"However what would happen if we were invaded by forces that grossly outnumber us? The Royal Cochin Army no longer has the absolute superiority in numbers that we enjoyed until the secession of Kazakhstan and Kyrghyztan. The Global strategic politics has also evolved in such a manner as it is possible that we may be faced with grossly outnumbering forces. In such a case depending on high mobility warfare alone would not be enough, we must prepare our nation to fight a high intensity attrition warfare as well."
"It is not possible to have defense structures like Border Guard Brigades spread out throughout the Kingdom. Such a policy would be a gross waste of our resources and man power. They would also be tactically unsound. It would spread our conventional and regular forces far too thinly, a situation that brings Napoleon's admonition on smuggling to memory. It is also pointless to create fortifications reminiscent of Maginot Line or Atlantic Line. No, what we need are more simpler, but more effective fortifications, that are easier to construct, and inexpensive in terms of men or material. This should be a defense network that can be maintained easily during peace time, with no unnecessary constraints on national economy or cause any grievance to our population."
"This is the policy as has been devised by Royal Cochin Army, Ministry of Interior and Royal Cochin Police Forces. The National Defense Corps formations in every Province and in every Municipality would be tasked to identify various potential axis of attack that could come upon their locality. City, Town and Village based defenses are what we are planning for. We should make every village as a point of attrition. Every center of population must be capable of supporting defensive operations. We must conceptualize a hostile force which would be massively over numbering us, we must slow their advance, we must be able to wage an attrition warfare so intense that they quit their invasion. For this every center of population must become a fortress in effect, complete with basic defensive structures, passive defenses and active defenses, called a Local Administrative Area Defense (LAAD)."
"NDC personnel along with Municipality Officials shall construct numerous Reserve Arsenals which shall be concealed structures with sizable weapons stores. Sizable quantities of fire arms for squad defenses, heavy machine guns, infantry mortars, Anti Tank Guided Missiles, MANPADS, Anti Vehicle and Anti Personnel Mines, field radios, demolition explosives and large quantities of infantry grade ammunition. All these weapons are to be drawn from respective QMC depots in the area. The major QMC depots could be identified by enemy and even destroyed, but the tools for defense must be scattered for ready use. Warehouses should also be maintained with structural materials for road blocks, hedge hogs, Caltropes, Barbed Wire, Sand bags and armor for pill box defenses. These stores would be maintained by the local NDC personnel along with the Municipality and Police officers of the area. These sites must also be made aware to the local Border Guard Brigades and any regular army formations. All help would be provided to conceal these depots using maskirovska. The NDC units must also prepare defense strategy so that in the event of a national emergency the required buildings in the area can easily be fortified s centers of resistance."
"Apart from these stores of local administrative area defense units (LAAD), NDC are also expected to establish District level Artillery Reserve Battalions (DARB). In every District concealed depots for the fielding of one full Battalion of 155mm Towed Guns must be established. These depots would comprise of the guns, tow trucks and sufficient ammunition and fuel for 45 days of continuous fighting. These DARB would also have integrated Air Defense Units to protect the artillery battalion comprising of a Company of Anti Air Artillery, tracked and wheeled."
"This would be the preliminary defense structure for the Attrition Defense Policy. The reserve personnel comprising the National Defense Corps wont be manning and operating these defenses, their operation would continue to be the mandate of service personnel of Royal Cochin Army. The National Defense Corps's principal duty would be as a support infrastructure for the combat operations which would be conducted by Royal Cochin Army units which would be assigned to these sectors. Only in case of incapacitation of these regular units can the local NDC units take over. The combat efficiency and tactical expertise of Royal Cochin Army units is not expected to be attained by the reserve duty personnel of National Defense Corps. However the local area expertise, tactical intelligence and terrain knowledge of the NDC personnel in these LAAD would be extremely important for sustained operations by the RCA units which is not expected to have local area awareness for effective defense. So both these formations would be mutually supportive but would have their own area of expertise."
"Now detailed information regarding tactics and procedures for this policy would be taught to you in this week. Accordingly you must supervise the establishment of these defenses in your assigned LAADs. Your dedication and work is absolutely essential for the all encompassing defense of our nation. Reserve personnel of NDC who report for their active duty would henceforth be trained in this policy so that during their weeks of service they learn how to properly integrate with regular units to mount an effective defense of their LAAD."
"So best of luck, Gentlemen. Let us work hard to secure our nation."
Thursday, December 16, 2010
Tuesday, December 14, 2010
Mountain Warfare School
Tok
Tibet
Mountain Warfare School
"Come on you stinky girls, is that all you can do? And you call yourselves soldiers. Do you want tampons my dearies? Bloody fairies, the lot of you."
The Drill Sergeant is bellowing in the faces of two elite soldiers of Royal Cochin Special Forces.
A Battalion from 23rd Special Forces regiment has been training at this facility for the past three weeks.
While the first 2 days of acclimatisation to the sheer cold and thin air of the Tibetan plateau was hell itself, the days succeeding made them think their intensive training regimen of initiation was pure vanilla.
Now the two commandos, both combat vets and with ranks of E5 Sergeants are having their backsides chewed to a pulp by a Squad Sergeant E6. The Sergeants had to deactivate a nuclear warhead. That in itself would not have been overtly taxing to these elite soldiers who between them had enough working knowledge to shame a University Professor. However the fact that they had to hack a hole in a perma frost lake and dive 30 ft under the surface to reach the warhead and they had to all that with a bare standard dive suit, no underwater breathing apparatus and only a weak penlight definitely put a cramp in their working.
This two man team attempted their first test today and it failed miserably. After 30 minutes in the bone chilling water they both were recalled to surface on the verge of hypothermia.
"You sodden fools, in a live situation by now you would have been dead and your genitals would be flying in a cloud 9 kms up in the sky. Now let us see what went wrong." The admonition from the instructor was particularly harsh for its decrease in vulgarity and forceful delivery. The Captain commanding the course took the team through video tapes that recorded their performance. Instead of alternating between one on bottom deactivating and on on surface maintaining the breach, switching positions every 50 seconds they both dived and when after 60 seconds came up for air found the breach in surface ice closed leaving only a small air gap. They had to expend a further 60 seconds to breach the ice.
The Captain then delivered the team to the hands of Squad Sergeant who would educate in a more forceful manner.
The Mountain Warfare School was set up as a joint venture between Kingdom of Cochin and Tibet. Before his soldiers could be tested this way their officers had to undergo an even tougher regimen. They had arrived three weeks earlier itself and had gone through the regimen with an even greater thoroughness. The very same Squad Sergeant had in fact questioned the very same Captain about the estimate numbers of fathers he possessed. Only after passing the tests would an officer would be permitted to command his soldiers to do the tests.
While the underwater exercises were going in one section of the lake , intense survival tests were being performed by still more commandos at an other part of the shore. Here they had to swim in the ice cold lake wearing only their uninsulated swimming trunks. They had to swim a distance of 100 meters and back and then had to pass a shooting range.
Meanwhile at some distance another group of commandos were doing a hard jog through the towering Himalayan mountains carrying a full combat load of 56 kgs. They were also being led by their officer who was packing a similar load. Shaming them and leading them were their drill sergeant a diminutive Sergeant First Class E7 who was jogging on the craggy and treacherous path carrying a non standard 60 kg path yet not breaking even a bead of sweat.
That was the standard these soldiers are aiming to attain.
For this was the toughest combat school devised for soldiers of Royal Cochin Defense Forces.
Only best units are permitted to come to the School and they must all be either combat veterans or have scored more than 500/550 in a Live fire field exercise. Even then enrolling for the program is voluntary as the School boasts a very high rate of attrition both in fail to pass as well as in deaths, for the harsh environs of Himalayan mountains test the commandos more than the craziest of the Instructors of the School.
The Mountain Warfare School is situated in a knoll of hills 13 kms west of the rustic village of Tok in northern Tibet. The lake of Dyap Tso is a perma frost endorheic lake. To further east of the school is a glacier that goes on to feed the lake Manasarovar further South.
On arriving at the rough landing strip supporting the base the recruits spend 2 full days acclimatising to the thin mountain air of Tok. During these days the recruits stay in well heated camp buildings and are fed with high protein and high fat diets.
On the third day the grueling initiation begins. Moved from their warm rooms to field tents adequately exposed to the nature they are henceforth given only standard combat rations. Each day begins at reveille at 0600 followed by a 5 mile run in the mountains. After 2 hours of running they come back for breakfast and freshing up.
At 0900 teams are assigned to various instructors for various physical tests of the day. Lunch will be at 1300 and will have to be carried to their test sites by the recruits themselves.
In the afternoon the recruits attend various lecture demonstrations and combat classes. In the evenings yet another endurance jogging is in store for the recruits now with full combat loads.
After the first week of joint training, recruits are divided into batches and tested batchwise. Their next lecture classes would be a hellish 21 days ahead.
The tests include further endurance marches, underwater weapon deactivation, Arctic endurance swimming, Arctic paradropping etc. On the 30th day of training the recruits board a couple of jeeps and are taken to a monastery nearby. There they shall be shown the spartan way of life followed by the monks. They would be taken then to several remote caves where ascetic Hindu sages would be in penance. These sages who live in the arctic conditions wearing only their bare loin clothes and swim in the freezing water and subsist on barely nothing would be visited by the soldiers. The sages had been persuaded to tolerate this interruptions by the King of Cochin himself who had come to visit them and seek their blessings when the camp was being set up.
On the next day individual commandos would be issued with a regular Special Forces combat load and paradropped into the Himalayas. They would be dropped individually at a distance of 100 kms from the base camp and have to find their way back alone. Each team of 4 shall have a particular base camp where they would have to reach successfully. They are given coordinates of base camp, a school atlas and a compass for navigation.
If a recruit found himself unable to cope with the harsh conditions or fell in some accident he could activate his alert beacon and be rescued by a team of CSAR helicopters on standby at the School.
Once the final endurance test is passed the recruits are given the Mountain Warriors Badge in a spartan ceremony at the Mountain Warriors School.
However that day is still far ahead in a distant future for these 2 Sergeants as they finally passed the test on their second attempt and moved on to the next test.
Tibet
Mountain Warfare School
"Come on you stinky girls, is that all you can do? And you call yourselves soldiers. Do you want tampons my dearies? Bloody fairies, the lot of you."
The Drill Sergeant is bellowing in the faces of two elite soldiers of Royal Cochin Special Forces.
A Battalion from 23rd Special Forces regiment has been training at this facility for the past three weeks.
While the first 2 days of acclimatisation to the sheer cold and thin air of the Tibetan plateau was hell itself, the days succeeding made them think their intensive training regimen of initiation was pure vanilla.
Now the two commandos, both combat vets and with ranks of E5 Sergeants are having their backsides chewed to a pulp by a Squad Sergeant E6. The Sergeants had to deactivate a nuclear warhead. That in itself would not have been overtly taxing to these elite soldiers who between them had enough working knowledge to shame a University Professor. However the fact that they had to hack a hole in a perma frost lake and dive 30 ft under the surface to reach the warhead and they had to all that with a bare standard dive suit, no underwater breathing apparatus and only a weak penlight definitely put a cramp in their working.
This two man team attempted their first test today and it failed miserably. After 30 minutes in the bone chilling water they both were recalled to surface on the verge of hypothermia.
"You sodden fools, in a live situation by now you would have been dead and your genitals would be flying in a cloud 9 kms up in the sky. Now let us see what went wrong." The admonition from the instructor was particularly harsh for its decrease in vulgarity and forceful delivery. The Captain commanding the course took the team through video tapes that recorded their performance. Instead of alternating between one on bottom deactivating and on on surface maintaining the breach, switching positions every 50 seconds they both dived and when after 60 seconds came up for air found the breach in surface ice closed leaving only a small air gap. They had to expend a further 60 seconds to breach the ice.
The Captain then delivered the team to the hands of Squad Sergeant who would educate in a more forceful manner.
The Mountain Warfare School was set up as a joint venture between Kingdom of Cochin and Tibet. Before his soldiers could be tested this way their officers had to undergo an even tougher regimen. They had arrived three weeks earlier itself and had gone through the regimen with an even greater thoroughness. The very same Squad Sergeant had in fact questioned the very same Captain about the estimate numbers of fathers he possessed. Only after passing the tests would an officer would be permitted to command his soldiers to do the tests.
While the underwater exercises were going in one section of the lake , intense survival tests were being performed by still more commandos at an other part of the shore. Here they had to swim in the ice cold lake wearing only their uninsulated swimming trunks. They had to swim a distance of 100 meters and back and then had to pass a shooting range.
Meanwhile at some distance another group of commandos were doing a hard jog through the towering Himalayan mountains carrying a full combat load of 56 kgs. They were also being led by their officer who was packing a similar load. Shaming them and leading them were their drill sergeant a diminutive Sergeant First Class E7 who was jogging on the craggy and treacherous path carrying a non standard 60 kg path yet not breaking even a bead of sweat.
That was the standard these soldiers are aiming to attain.
For this was the toughest combat school devised for soldiers of Royal Cochin Defense Forces.
Only best units are permitted to come to the School and they must all be either combat veterans or have scored more than 500/550 in a Live fire field exercise. Even then enrolling for the program is voluntary as the School boasts a very high rate of attrition both in fail to pass as well as in deaths, for the harsh environs of Himalayan mountains test the commandos more than the craziest of the Instructors of the School.
The Mountain Warfare School is situated in a knoll of hills 13 kms west of the rustic village of Tok in northern Tibet. The lake of Dyap Tso is a perma frost endorheic lake. To further east of the school is a glacier that goes on to feed the lake Manasarovar further South.
On arriving at the rough landing strip supporting the base the recruits spend 2 full days acclimatising to the thin mountain air of Tok. During these days the recruits stay in well heated camp buildings and are fed with high protein and high fat diets.
On the third day the grueling initiation begins. Moved from their warm rooms to field tents adequately exposed to the nature they are henceforth given only standard combat rations. Each day begins at reveille at 0600 followed by a 5 mile run in the mountains. After 2 hours of running they come back for breakfast and freshing up.
At 0900 teams are assigned to various instructors for various physical tests of the day. Lunch will be at 1300 and will have to be carried to their test sites by the recruits themselves.
In the afternoon the recruits attend various lecture demonstrations and combat classes. In the evenings yet another endurance jogging is in store for the recruits now with full combat loads.
After the first week of joint training, recruits are divided into batches and tested batchwise. Their next lecture classes would be a hellish 21 days ahead.
The tests include further endurance marches, underwater weapon deactivation, Arctic endurance swimming, Arctic paradropping etc. On the 30th day of training the recruits board a couple of jeeps and are taken to a monastery nearby. There they shall be shown the spartan way of life followed by the monks. They would be taken then to several remote caves where ascetic Hindu sages would be in penance. These sages who live in the arctic conditions wearing only their bare loin clothes and swim in the freezing water and subsist on barely nothing would be visited by the soldiers. The sages had been persuaded to tolerate this interruptions by the King of Cochin himself who had come to visit them and seek their blessings when the camp was being set up.
On the next day individual commandos would be issued with a regular Special Forces combat load and paradropped into the Himalayas. They would be dropped individually at a distance of 100 kms from the base camp and have to find their way back alone. Each team of 4 shall have a particular base camp where they would have to reach successfully. They are given coordinates of base camp, a school atlas and a compass for navigation.
If a recruit found himself unable to cope with the harsh conditions or fell in some accident he could activate his alert beacon and be rescued by a team of CSAR helicopters on standby at the School.
Once the final endurance test is passed the recruits are given the Mountain Warriors Badge in a spartan ceremony at the Mountain Warriors School.
However that day is still far ahead in a distant future for these 2 Sergeants as they finally passed the test on their second attempt and moved on to the next test.
Wednesday, December 8, 2010
War Memorial
The 21 gun salute reverberated across the Parade Grounds in the city of Cochin as a honor guard composed of all combat wings of Royal Cochin Defense Forces, fired off their guns in unison to mark the start of the ceremony.
In the chilly morning of this somber day the King of Cochin, his cabinet secretaries and the military chiefs of staff were standing in attention as they were paying tributes to the fallen warriors who gave Cochin its freedom and integrity.
In the center of the Parade Ground a Grey silk shroud covered a massive monument. Once the guns were silent The King and the service chiefs marched towards the shroud to the beats of the King's Guards band which was playing the National Anthem.
As the procession came to a halt so did the band.
The King reached up and pulled the shroud off.
And thus the National War Memorial was formally submitted to the nation.
The massive granite obelisk was engraved with the names of the nearly 300,000 soldiers who had died in service of the Kingdom. More than half of them had died in offensive warfare and that was the burden upon the shoulders of the King. As a young officer in the armored corps of the nation Rama Varma had personally seen the horrors and futility of war. Thus while drawing and shedding blood in defense of the Kingdom under the reign of his uncle, the previous monarch, Rama Varma had sworn that never again shall Cochin be expansionist in nature.
Today he had the chance to finally put his horrors at ease. The names of his comrades from Echo company went through his mind also the the ghastly images of a tank burning and the sight of a young man desperately trying and failing to climb out of the hatch of a stricken tank while being devoured by flames from a sea of burning diesel and dismembered by shrapnel from exploding ordinance.
He could still remember sharply the final image of the young Peter looking at his Commander before the tank finally exploded in a fountain of flames.
Tonight he had a chance to lay his old nightmares to rest.
Also looking at the monument with an unfocused eye was his elder cousin and the commander of his regiment during the war, now Commander of Royal Cochin Defense Forces, Gen. Mahesh Varma. He too was remembering the voices and faces of people long dead.
This was the least a grateful Kingdom and its King could do for the glorious martyrs who laid down their life in the line of duty.
As the King and his generals walked back to their vehicles tears were shed ,some solemnly , some copiously, but not an eye was dry.
Vice Adm. KP Marakkar was remembering the groan of a hundred sailors drowning to death in a sunken destroyer which his submarine had torpedoed. As the Captain of his attack submarine he had listened to the sonar while his enemy was sinking. The sounds of strangling emanating from a hundred young extinguished lives had reminded him that no, war is never acceptable. He proceeded to sink more ships as the CO of his submarine and later as CO of the submarine squadron but he never forgot the gravity of actions he was doing.
Air Vice Marshal Praveen Kumar was remembering the fateful May Day when he led his squadron of fighters against the deadline enemy aerial blitzkrieg. He could remember the shrieks of his wingman Bronco who was shredded in his seat by Vulcan gunfire. Nor could he forget the bleeding face of his Navigator Jumper while they ejected as a desperate missile shot by a dead fighter homed in on their engines and blew merely yards away from their wings. Jumper was his best friend and was eager to meet his young daughter who was born merely day ago. He never saw his daughter.
The senior enlisted personnel who stood guard at the Memorial understood and were grateful for the tears of their commanders. They too had known the horrors of war and were glad to see that their commanders and King understood it as well.
The King shook hands with the Command Sergeant Majors and Chief Boatswain's Mates from all services who comprised the Memorial Guard and with a sad but lightened heart returned to the Palace.
In the chilly morning of this somber day the King of Cochin, his cabinet secretaries and the military chiefs of staff were standing in attention as they were paying tributes to the fallen warriors who gave Cochin its freedom and integrity.
In the center of the Parade Ground a Grey silk shroud covered a massive monument. Once the guns were silent The King and the service chiefs marched towards the shroud to the beats of the King's Guards band which was playing the National Anthem.
As the procession came to a halt so did the band.
The King reached up and pulled the shroud off.
And thus the National War Memorial was formally submitted to the nation.
The massive granite obelisk was engraved with the names of the nearly 300,000 soldiers who had died in service of the Kingdom. More than half of them had died in offensive warfare and that was the burden upon the shoulders of the King. As a young officer in the armored corps of the nation Rama Varma had personally seen the horrors and futility of war. Thus while drawing and shedding blood in defense of the Kingdom under the reign of his uncle, the previous monarch, Rama Varma had sworn that never again shall Cochin be expansionist in nature.
Today he had the chance to finally put his horrors at ease. The names of his comrades from Echo company went through his mind also the the ghastly images of a tank burning and the sight of a young man desperately trying and failing to climb out of the hatch of a stricken tank while being devoured by flames from a sea of burning diesel and dismembered by shrapnel from exploding ordinance.
He could still remember sharply the final image of the young Peter looking at his Commander before the tank finally exploded in a fountain of flames.
Tonight he had a chance to lay his old nightmares to rest.
Also looking at the monument with an unfocused eye was his elder cousin and the commander of his regiment during the war, now Commander of Royal Cochin Defense Forces, Gen. Mahesh Varma. He too was remembering the voices and faces of people long dead.
This was the least a grateful Kingdom and its King could do for the glorious martyrs who laid down their life in the line of duty.
As the King and his generals walked back to their vehicles tears were shed ,some solemnly , some copiously, but not an eye was dry.
Vice Adm. KP Marakkar was remembering the groan of a hundred sailors drowning to death in a sunken destroyer which his submarine had torpedoed. As the Captain of his attack submarine he had listened to the sonar while his enemy was sinking. The sounds of strangling emanating from a hundred young extinguished lives had reminded him that no, war is never acceptable. He proceeded to sink more ships as the CO of his submarine and later as CO of the submarine squadron but he never forgot the gravity of actions he was doing.
Air Vice Marshal Praveen Kumar was remembering the fateful May Day when he led his squadron of fighters against the deadline enemy aerial blitzkrieg. He could remember the shrieks of his wingman Bronco who was shredded in his seat by Vulcan gunfire. Nor could he forget the bleeding face of his Navigator Jumper while they ejected as a desperate missile shot by a dead fighter homed in on their engines and blew merely yards away from their wings. Jumper was his best friend and was eager to meet his young daughter who was born merely day ago. He never saw his daughter.
The senior enlisted personnel who stood guard at the Memorial understood and were grateful for the tears of their commanders. They too had known the horrors of war and were glad to see that their commanders and King understood it as well.
The King shook hands with the Command Sergeant Majors and Chief Boatswain's Mates from all services who comprised the Memorial Guard and with a sad but lightened heart returned to the Palace.
Friday, December 3, 2010
Anti Air Defense Doctrine
Anti Air Defense Doctrine
The Anti Air Defense Doctrine comprises of an Outer Area Defense and Inner Area Defense. Outer Area Defense involves the defensive network of warly warning radars and a interdiction Air Defense Batteries arrayed around the border regions of the Kingdom. The Outer Area Defense has already expostulated as per Integrated Defense Policy of dividing the nation into three sectors, with each sector having interlinked radar networks with strategic depth. The Outer Area Defense's radar networks consists of 200 NM range, XL12 radars and 400 NM range XL117 radars. The interconnecting networks of these radars provide a nearly impregnable Air Defense Barrier along the borders of the nation.
XL12 and XL117 as stationary radar installations and hence are liable to be targeted in an Anti Radiation attack as a precursor to deep penetration strikes on the Kingdom's territory. Thus these are reinforced along the borders by a secondary layer of radars operated by each Border Guard Brigade consisting of a Battalion of Mobile Radar trucks per Brigade and Aerostats which provide a low level air defense potential.
The detection capabilities of the OAD radar network is complemented by batteries of Surface to Air Missiles comprising of SD5, SD4, SD3, SD2 and SD2R air defense missiles. OAD has 5 batteries of each of these missiles discretely and stealthily installed per Border Guard Brigade sector. These installations are naturally camouflaged fixed installations which would receive targeting and terminal guidance from the Air Defense Network and would not have independent guidance systems to prevent them being targeted due to their radiation parameters. These fixed RCAF defense batteries would be reinforced by the mobile SAM batteries maintained by the Border Guard Brigades for tactical low level air defense.
The Outer Area Defense is reinforced by the Inner Area Defense which defines Air Defense in the interior zones of the Kingdom. IAD involves 60 km range XL27 radars which would be installed every 2500 square kilometers in the Kingdom. This network again involves a design such that any specific land area would be covered by at least 2 XL27 radars to facilitate triangulation and redundancy. The XL27 radars are automated facilities that would be remotely controlled by Zonal Air Defense Commands in each Province of the Kingdom. The operation of these radars would also be governed by Air Defense Network. These uniform radar concentration is reinforced by concentrated radar coverage in certain Air Attack Corridors determined by RCAF which are atmospherically and strategically optimum for an air attack on a territory. This includes mountain passes, mountain ranges, strategic hills near cities etc. IAD also involves Aerostat mounted radars for special protection of high density population regions, such as cities, towns etc.
The offensive form of IAD consists of Surface to Air Missile batteries located around every major city and town, power stations, power grid components, major industrial, scientific and commercial facilities, vital logistic and transport corridors and vital defense establishments. High population centers and above mentioned target types would also have automated CIWS batteries arrayed around them in ringed defensive perimeters. IAD includes defense of Astra rail gun batteries.
The third layer of Air Defense is the Strategic Defense Network consisting of HAWK Over the Horizon radars installed at 5 locations in the Kingdom of Cochin, the 5 Bright Star locations and the Anti Ballistic Missile Batteries located around major population, industrial and defense centers.
The concentration of these large number of radars and Air Defense systems would be imperfect without the Air Defense Network. This is a high bandwidth information pathway that connects every single radar and every single offensive weapon platform in the Kingdom. This highly automated protocol has been developed by Strategic Command, Royal Cochin Air Force and Varma Institute of Fundamental Research. This communication network depends on a physical layer consisting of optical fiber cables in reinforced pathways, secure satellite burst communications and Integrated Military Communications Network. Air Defense Network is a form of cloud computing whereby every single radar is a node and an integrated air defense status is created by the network. It is not necessary for all the radars to be online at any time. The information gained by any single radar is simultaneously passed on to the ADN grid by which every radar gets the picture. The protocol is an intelligent system which randomly activates and deactivates radars in the network so that any single radar may not lend itself to be targeted by a hostile force. The random switching nature of ADN also lends it a pulsating nature. The multiple layered defenses means that the redundant defenses would be activated only when the primary defenses in the sector has been destroyed. This destruction would in any way alert the Air Defense Network which can call in reinforcements from RCAF's fighter regiments assigned to the Air Defense Zone.
Threats detected are engaged by the the SAM batteries whose missiles receive targeting information not from a single radar but from the communication network itself. This communication with the missile is maintained either through the launcher itself or through MILCOM network which exists independent of ADN. Thus even if one or more radars in the region is shut down, the missile would continue to be tracked and receive targeting from the other defense communication infrastructure in the Kingdom. The Air Defense Network can also work with airborne and maritime radar platforms with ease. To prevent its incapacitation during EMP attack, all ADN assets have been protected by Class A Silver Shield Protocol and only Silver Shield rated switching gear and hardware have been used.
While XL class of radars use Ionosonders, and Phased Array technology with electronically controlled wave guidance, Hawk Radars use 12MW powered multistatic radar, creeping waves and electromagnetic surface waves for its operations.
Ultimately Anti Air Defense Doctrine is created not to defend against an overwhelming airborne attack on its own, but to provide warning that such an attack is taking place to RCAF Command and provide as much attrition as it can. The Air Defense Network has proven its robustness in several air defense exercies and simulations and survivability against wide spectrum EMP attacks conducted by High Energy Research Institute.
The doctrine and its components are available for sharing with the valued allies of the Kingdom of Cochin.
The Anti Air Defense Doctrine comprises of an Outer Area Defense and Inner Area Defense. Outer Area Defense involves the defensive network of warly warning radars and a interdiction Air Defense Batteries arrayed around the border regions of the Kingdom. The Outer Area Defense has already expostulated as per Integrated Defense Policy of dividing the nation into three sectors, with each sector having interlinked radar networks with strategic depth. The Outer Area Defense's radar networks consists of 200 NM range, XL12 radars and 400 NM range XL117 radars. The interconnecting networks of these radars provide a nearly impregnable Air Defense Barrier along the borders of the nation.
XL12 and XL117 as stationary radar installations and hence are liable to be targeted in an Anti Radiation attack as a precursor to deep penetration strikes on the Kingdom's territory. Thus these are reinforced along the borders by a secondary layer of radars operated by each Border Guard Brigade consisting of a Battalion of Mobile Radar trucks per Brigade and Aerostats which provide a low level air defense potential.
The detection capabilities of the OAD radar network is complemented by batteries of Surface to Air Missiles comprising of SD5, SD4, SD3, SD2 and SD2R air defense missiles. OAD has 5 batteries of each of these missiles discretely and stealthily installed per Border Guard Brigade sector. These installations are naturally camouflaged fixed installations which would receive targeting and terminal guidance from the Air Defense Network and would not have independent guidance systems to prevent them being targeted due to their radiation parameters. These fixed RCAF defense batteries would be reinforced by the mobile SAM batteries maintained by the Border Guard Brigades for tactical low level air defense.
The Outer Area Defense is reinforced by the Inner Area Defense which defines Air Defense in the interior zones of the Kingdom. IAD involves 60 km range XL27 radars which would be installed every 2500 square kilometers in the Kingdom. This network again involves a design such that any specific land area would be covered by at least 2 XL27 radars to facilitate triangulation and redundancy. The XL27 radars are automated facilities that would be remotely controlled by Zonal Air Defense Commands in each Province of the Kingdom. The operation of these radars would also be governed by Air Defense Network. These uniform radar concentration is reinforced by concentrated radar coverage in certain Air Attack Corridors determined by RCAF which are atmospherically and strategically optimum for an air attack on a territory. This includes mountain passes, mountain ranges, strategic hills near cities etc. IAD also involves Aerostat mounted radars for special protection of high density population regions, such as cities, towns etc.
The offensive form of IAD consists of Surface to Air Missile batteries located around every major city and town, power stations, power grid components, major industrial, scientific and commercial facilities, vital logistic and transport corridors and vital defense establishments. High population centers and above mentioned target types would also have automated CIWS batteries arrayed around them in ringed defensive perimeters. IAD includes defense of Astra rail gun batteries.
The third layer of Air Defense is the Strategic Defense Network consisting of HAWK Over the Horizon radars installed at 5 locations in the Kingdom of Cochin, the 5 Bright Star locations and the Anti Ballistic Missile Batteries located around major population, industrial and defense centers.
The concentration of these large number of radars and Air Defense systems would be imperfect without the Air Defense Network. This is a high bandwidth information pathway that connects every single radar and every single offensive weapon platform in the Kingdom. This highly automated protocol has been developed by Strategic Command, Royal Cochin Air Force and Varma Institute of Fundamental Research. This communication network depends on a physical layer consisting of optical fiber cables in reinforced pathways, secure satellite burst communications and Integrated Military Communications Network. Air Defense Network is a form of cloud computing whereby every single radar is a node and an integrated air defense status is created by the network. It is not necessary for all the radars to be online at any time. The information gained by any single radar is simultaneously passed on to the ADN grid by which every radar gets the picture. The protocol is an intelligent system which randomly activates and deactivates radars in the network so that any single radar may not lend itself to be targeted by a hostile force. The random switching nature of ADN also lends it a pulsating nature. The multiple layered defenses means that the redundant defenses would be activated only when the primary defenses in the sector has been destroyed. This destruction would in any way alert the Air Defense Network which can call in reinforcements from RCAF's fighter regiments assigned to the Air Defense Zone.
Threats detected are engaged by the the SAM batteries whose missiles receive targeting information not from a single radar but from the communication network itself. This communication with the missile is maintained either through the launcher itself or through MILCOM network which exists independent of ADN. Thus even if one or more radars in the region is shut down, the missile would continue to be tracked and receive targeting from the other defense communication infrastructure in the Kingdom. The Air Defense Network can also work with airborne and maritime radar platforms with ease. To prevent its incapacitation during EMP attack, all ADN assets have been protected by Class A Silver Shield Protocol and only Silver Shield rated switching gear and hardware have been used.
While XL class of radars use Ionosonders, and Phased Array technology with electronically controlled wave guidance, Hawk Radars use 12MW powered multistatic radar, creeping waves and electromagnetic surface waves for its operations.
Ultimately Anti Air Defense Doctrine is created not to defend against an overwhelming airborne attack on its own, but to provide warning that such an attack is taking place to RCAF Command and provide as much attrition as it can. The Air Defense Network has proven its robustness in several air defense exercies and simulations and survivability against wide spectrum EMP attacks conducted by High Energy Research Institute.
The doctrine and its components are available for sharing with the valued allies of the Kingdom of Cochin.
Wednesday, December 1, 2010
Integrated Defense Policy
Integrated Defense Policy
Royal Cochin Defense Forces
As Commanded by His Highness Kerala Varma, the King of Cochin , Royal Cochin Defense Forces has the primary mandate with regards to the defense of the realm.
The Integrated Defense Policy comprised of Territorial, Maritime and Aerial Defense of the nation. The various individual policies are the mandates of various branches of the RCDF, however are required to perform in an integrated manner at all times. While several aspects of the Integrated Defense Policy has already been enumerated by various responsible branches, certain aspects have rooms for improvements, hence the promulgation of the new policy directives.
The defense of the realm has been divided into three zones of action, Maritime Defense, Himalayan Defense and Xinjiang Defense. This is due to the unique geographical nature of these Zones of Action.
Maritime Defense Zone comprises the coastal provinces of India from coast of Gujarat to Chittagong in Bengal Province, Lakshadweep - Maldives Administration, Andaman - Nicobar Administration and Baloch Province.
Himalayan Defense Zone refers to the plain regions of India, from Gujarat to Assam Province, the Himalayan areas of Tibet and Kashmir.
The Xinjiang Defense Zone refers to the Xinjiang Province and the National Capital Territory.
With regard to Terrestrial defense of the Kingdom, the prime mandate goes to the Border Guards Directorate of RCDF. Border Guards has an already robust constitution and effective defense policies with regards to facing an attack from land. There is unlikely to be any changes to the Border Guard Doctrine or Terrestrial Defense Doctrine.
With regard to Maritime Defense, its application lies exclusively in the Maritime Defense Zone in India. This defense is to be a multi-layered system which is flexible, practical, robust and effective. The onus is on economical passive defenses at the front end defenses,ie, a network of tidal wave generators along the appropriate coastal areas so that the tidal power of the waves can be generated for electricity. Established a few meters off the coast line, these generators would generate adequate electric power for local communities, provide storm shelter, as well as provide calmer channels for local fishing industries to pass through into open seas. The design and layout of these tidal power generators would be such that they would create an effective passive defense against hostile amphibious operations. Local Area Attrition Defense groups organized by National Defense Corps would also ready stockpiles of hedgehogs to be deployed in times of crisis.
Further offshore, at distances of 12 NM, 23 NM, 47 NM, 55 NM from coast lines there would be layers of mines and ISLMM Torpedoes, with mine free channels designated by Royal Cochin Coast Guard. RCCG has the mandate of maintaining these mine fields with waters beyond 60 NM the responsibility of Royal Cochin Navy. Commercial ships transiting Cochin waters would get channels of sailing assigned to them by the Royal Cochin Navy and Royal Cochin Coast Guard through Ministry of Transportation, Department of Shipping.
The network of mines and the passive defense structure provided by tidal power generators is expected to be a delaying factor and not a stopping factor with regards to a determined amphibious assault. Active counter measures in any case would be provided by the network of Astra rail gun systems located every 50 NM along the coast of the Kingdom. The 200 NM range offensive weapons is expected to give an adequate attrition to any enemy force and batteries of POSID AShMs established every 50 km by RCCG stations is expected to give fixed long range defense solutions. A network of Aerostats arrayed around the coast is also expected to provide early warning and targeting capabilities to the weapons platforms. The Astra Systems would be protected by individual AAD batteries and Strategic Command Combat soldiers. They would be further supported by the proposed Static Area Defense Platforms, which are static batteries of 155 mm field guns, installed and operated as camouflaged structures and operated by the National Defense Corps personnel.
All this would be augmented by the Air Defense Network's layers of radars. A total of 47, 200 NM XL12 radars and 6, 400 NM XL117 radars are currently operational in this Zone as part of the Air Defense Doctrine which would contribute to improve the Maritime Defenses.
If and when the Maritime Defenses are breached the mandate for defense rests upon Royal Cochin Army.
In Himalayan Defense Zone, the terrestrial defense is the mandate of the Border Guards and the air defense that of Royal Cochin Air Force. A total of 19, 200 NM XL12 radars and 5, 400 NM XL117 radars are currently operational in this Zone as part of the Air Defense Doctrine.
In Xinjiang Defense, due to the location of Cochin City and number of potentially hostile neighbors, the defense is deemed the highest priority. A total of 27, 200 NM XL12 radars and 5, 400 NM XL117 radars are currently operational as part of the Air Defense Doctrine in this one single province alone.
The Air Defense Doctrine envisions interspersed layers of XL12 and XL117 radars with the HAWK Strategic Radars to provide Air Defense Warning. Dedicated Anti Air Defense Batteries would be stationed along side Border Guard defenses and around all vital industrial and population centers. All vital buildings would have dedicated mobile AAA companies assigned. To support the AAA batteries would be installed primary, secondary and tertiary CIWS systems. Aerial Warning Aerostats would be deployed in all border regions, at the rate of one per 50 kilometers and one per 100 kilometers staggered 60 kilometers to the rear. In terms of conflict Air Defense Doctrine would also make use the the AWACS regiments of HALOBs and MERATs of Royal Cochin Air Force. Threats detected by the Air Defense Doctrine would be interdicted by the Royal Cochin Air Force.
The Integrated Defense Policy is aimed at making any offense against the Kingdom of Cochin a painstaking and costly affair for an aggressor and to negate opportunities for tactical surprise to the aggressors. Using a variety of active and passive defense doctrines, the Kingdom is hoping to establish a multi-spectrum defense solution so that any single form of attack will not cripple our defense. The Integrated Defense Policy is designed by conceptualizing a worst case scenario wherein, the Kingdom of Cochin faces attacks from multiple fronts, ie, a minimum of 8 fronts and an undisclosed maximum. Integrated Defense Policy is not an infallible doctrine and would be subject to revisions as per changing strategic climates, defense necessities and improving military technologies.
MARITIME DEFENSE ZONE
HIMALAYAN DEFENSE ZONE
XINJIANG DEFENSE ZONE
Royal Cochin Defense Forces
As Commanded by His Highness Kerala Varma, the King of Cochin , Royal Cochin Defense Forces has the primary mandate with regards to the defense of the realm.
The Integrated Defense Policy comprised of Territorial, Maritime and Aerial Defense of the nation. The various individual policies are the mandates of various branches of the RCDF, however are required to perform in an integrated manner at all times. While several aspects of the Integrated Defense Policy has already been enumerated by various responsible branches, certain aspects have rooms for improvements, hence the promulgation of the new policy directives.
The defense of the realm has been divided into three zones of action, Maritime Defense, Himalayan Defense and Xinjiang Defense. This is due to the unique geographical nature of these Zones of Action.
Maritime Defense Zone comprises the coastal provinces of India from coast of Gujarat to Chittagong in Bengal Province, Lakshadweep - Maldives Administration, Andaman - Nicobar Administration and Baloch Province.
Himalayan Defense Zone refers to the plain regions of India, from Gujarat to Assam Province, the Himalayan areas of Tibet and Kashmir.
The Xinjiang Defense Zone refers to the Xinjiang Province and the National Capital Territory.
With regard to Terrestrial defense of the Kingdom, the prime mandate goes to the Border Guards Directorate of RCDF. Border Guards has an already robust constitution and effective defense policies with regards to facing an attack from land. There is unlikely to be any changes to the Border Guard Doctrine or Terrestrial Defense Doctrine.
With regard to Maritime Defense, its application lies exclusively in the Maritime Defense Zone in India. This defense is to be a multi-layered system which is flexible, practical, robust and effective. The onus is on economical passive defenses at the front end defenses,ie, a network of tidal wave generators along the appropriate coastal areas so that the tidal power of the waves can be generated for electricity. Established a few meters off the coast line, these generators would generate adequate electric power for local communities, provide storm shelter, as well as provide calmer channels for local fishing industries to pass through into open seas. The design and layout of these tidal power generators would be such that they would create an effective passive defense against hostile amphibious operations. Local Area Attrition Defense groups organized by National Defense Corps would also ready stockpiles of hedgehogs to be deployed in times of crisis.
Further offshore, at distances of 12 NM, 23 NM, 47 NM, 55 NM from coast lines there would be layers of mines and ISLMM Torpedoes, with mine free channels designated by Royal Cochin Coast Guard. RCCG has the mandate of maintaining these mine fields with waters beyond 60 NM the responsibility of Royal Cochin Navy. Commercial ships transiting Cochin waters would get channels of sailing assigned to them by the Royal Cochin Navy and Royal Cochin Coast Guard through Ministry of Transportation, Department of Shipping.
The network of mines and the passive defense structure provided by tidal power generators is expected to be a delaying factor and not a stopping factor with regards to a determined amphibious assault. Active counter measures in any case would be provided by the network of Astra rail gun systems located every 50 NM along the coast of the Kingdom. The 200 NM range offensive weapons is expected to give an adequate attrition to any enemy force and batteries of POSID AShMs established every 50 km by RCCG stations is expected to give fixed long range defense solutions. A network of Aerostats arrayed around the coast is also expected to provide early warning and targeting capabilities to the weapons platforms. The Astra Systems would be protected by individual AAD batteries and Strategic Command Combat soldiers. They would be further supported by the proposed Static Area Defense Platforms, which are static batteries of 155 mm field guns, installed and operated as camouflaged structures and operated by the National Defense Corps personnel.
All this would be augmented by the Air Defense Network's layers of radars. A total of 47, 200 NM XL12 radars and 6, 400 NM XL117 radars are currently operational in this Zone as part of the Air Defense Doctrine which would contribute to improve the Maritime Defenses.
If and when the Maritime Defenses are breached the mandate for defense rests upon Royal Cochin Army.
In Himalayan Defense Zone, the terrestrial defense is the mandate of the Border Guards and the air defense that of Royal Cochin Air Force. A total of 19, 200 NM XL12 radars and 5, 400 NM XL117 radars are currently operational in this Zone as part of the Air Defense Doctrine.
In Xinjiang Defense, due to the location of Cochin City and number of potentially hostile neighbors, the defense is deemed the highest priority. A total of 27, 200 NM XL12 radars and 5, 400 NM XL117 radars are currently operational as part of the Air Defense Doctrine in this one single province alone.
The Air Defense Doctrine envisions interspersed layers of XL12 and XL117 radars with the HAWK Strategic Radars to provide Air Defense Warning. Dedicated Anti Air Defense Batteries would be stationed along side Border Guard defenses and around all vital industrial and population centers. All vital buildings would have dedicated mobile AAA companies assigned. To support the AAA batteries would be installed primary, secondary and tertiary CIWS systems. Aerial Warning Aerostats would be deployed in all border regions, at the rate of one per 50 kilometers and one per 100 kilometers staggered 60 kilometers to the rear. In terms of conflict Air Defense Doctrine would also make use the the AWACS regiments of HALOBs and MERATs of Royal Cochin Air Force. Threats detected by the Air Defense Doctrine would be interdicted by the Royal Cochin Air Force.
The Integrated Defense Policy is aimed at making any offense against the Kingdom of Cochin a painstaking and costly affair for an aggressor and to negate opportunities for tactical surprise to the aggressors. Using a variety of active and passive defense doctrines, the Kingdom is hoping to establish a multi-spectrum defense solution so that any single form of attack will not cripple our defense. The Integrated Defense Policy is designed by conceptualizing a worst case scenario wherein, the Kingdom of Cochin faces attacks from multiple fronts, ie, a minimum of 8 fronts and an undisclosed maximum. Integrated Defense Policy is not an infallible doctrine and would be subject to revisions as per changing strategic climates, defense necessities and improving military technologies.
MARITIME DEFENSE ZONE
Resized to 74% (was 1360 x 747) - Click image to enlarge
HIMALAYAN DEFENSE ZONE
Resized to 74% (was 1360 x 747) - Click image to enlarge
XINJIANG DEFENSE ZONE
Resized to 74% (was 1360 x 747) - Click image to enlarge
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